Proceedings of the British Academy, 214,	155–170,	©	The	British	Academy	2018. 10 What Has History to Do with Philosophy? Insights from the Medieval Contemplative Tradition CHRISTINA VAN DYKE the fIeld of the hIStory of	philosophy	is	rife	with	disagreements	about	its	own nature.	While	some	scholars	work	actively to	bring	historical	figures	and	ideas into conversation with contemporary debates, other scholars cry 'Violence!' and dismiss	their	work	as	anachronistic.	At	the	same	time,	detailed	textual	reconstruction	and	analysis	are	discounted	by	others	as	philology	rather than	philosophy, and	demand	is	made	for	'Arguments!'	These	disagreements	have,	in	turn,	shaped the	ways	in	which	historians	of	philosophy	have	interacted	(or	not	interacted)	with contemporary	philosophers.	Too	often, the contribution	of	historically	oriented philosophers	to	modern	discussions	has	been	reduced	to	volunteering	ideological nuggets	mined	from	ancient	sources,	or	to	explicating	theories	whose	value	stems in	part	from	their	very	lack	of	connection	to	current	interests.1 This chapter highlights a different corrective and complementary role that historically	informed	philosophy	can	play	in	contemporary	discussions.	Analysis of the development of key definitions, concepts, principles, and so on, often illuminates	problematic	prejudices that call for a re-examination	of the	philosophical considerations in their favour-a re-examination that should involve looking at the relevant historical context in which the idea developed. In what follows,	I	demonstrate,	via	the	case	study	of	medieval	and	modern	conceptions of	mystical experience, that turning to the relevant	historical context	can	also provide	viable	philosophical	resources	with	which	to	complement	existing	discussions.	What it takes for an experience to count as genuinely	mystical has been the source of significant controversy;	most current philosophical definitions	of	'mystical	experience'	exclude	embodied,	non-unitive	states,	but, in	so doing, they	exclude the	majority	of reported	mystical experiences. I	use	a reexamination	of	the	full	range	of	reported	medieval	mystical	experiences-both 1 See	Chapter	9,	this	volume,	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	these	two	extremes,	as	well	as	an	alternative different	from	the	one	I	lay	out	here. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 155 20/11/2017 14:16 156 Christina van Dyke in	the	apophatic	tradition,	which	excludes	or	denigrates	embodied	states,	and	in the	affective	tradition,	which	treats	such	states	as	fully	mystical-to	demonstrate how	a	better	understanding	of	the	historical	medieval	mystic	tradition	can	serve as	a	valuable	complement	to	ongoing	philosophical	discussions	of	religious	and mystical	experience.	I	conclude	by	suggesting	that	this	approach	can	also	help philosophers	engage	in	meaningful	interaction	with	scholars	working	on	similar topics in other disciplines. 10.1.	Implicit	Assumptions	and	the	Case	of 'Mystical Experience' The	stories	behind	the	development	and	adoption	of	any	number	of	philosophical definitions,	principles, and	concepts are complex-and,	often,	problematic-in ways	that	should	impact	our	use	of	them	today.	I	focus	on	the	concept	of	'mystical experience' in this chapter because it provides an excellent case study not only	of	this	point	but	also	of	the	ways	in	which	historically	informed	philosophy can respond. There is a rich tradition within medieval mysticism, for instance, of	treating	embodied	experiences	as	genuinely	mystical,	on	which	contemporary scholars	can-and	should-draw	in	order to	complement the	existing	focus	on non-sensory,	selfless	mystic	union. In the remainder of this section, I explicate the current philosophical conception of mystical experience in the context of its 20th-century influences, showing	how	prejudices	against	women,	emotions,	and	the	body	have	played	a significant role in	determining	which	sort	of reported	mystical	experiences fall under the contemporary definition and which do not. The role of these nonphilosophical	factors	thus	motivates	enquiry,	in	Sections	10.2	and	10.3,	into	the philosophical	considerations	for	and	against	that	narrow	focus. Let us begin our enquiry, then,	where everyone begins their philosophical enquiries	these	days:	with	the	corresponding	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article.2	The	definition	of	'mystical	experience'	in	the	entry	on	'Mysticism'	does an excellent job capturing general philosophical assumptions about	mysticism and	is, in	fact,	specifically	described	as	'suiting	more	specialized	treatments	of mysticism in philosophy': Mystical experience:	A	(purportedly)	super	sense-perceptual	or	sub	sense-perceptual unitive	experience	granting	acquaintance	of	realities	or	states	of	affairs	that	are	of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection.3 2 In	this	case,	a	very	good	place	to	start.	It	possesses,	among	other	virtues,	an	excellent	bibliography of	previous	philosophical	treatments	of	mysticism. 3 Jerome	Gellman	offers	this	definition	in	his	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on mysticism.	The	more	general	definition	he	offers	does	not	include	the	word	'unitive'	but	is	otherwise	the same.	See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 156 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 157 For	our	purposes,	the	first	thing	of	note	about	this	definition	is	its	insistence	that a	mystical experience	must be either 'super' or 'sub' perceptual.4	To count as 'super sense-perceptual',	an	experience	must	have	'perception-like	content	of	a kind not appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory modalities ... or standard introspection'.5	That	is,	although	a	mystical	experience	may	accompany	or	even be occasioned by sense perception, as when one has a mystical experience while watching	the	sun	set,	the	experience	itself	must	transcend	the	senses	in	a	distinctive	way.	This	definition	explicitly	rules	out	visions,	auditions,	and	other	sensebased experiences from the category of mystical experience: '[p]ara-sensual experiences such	as religious	visions	and	auditions fail to	make	an	experience mystical'6.	To count as 'sub sense-perceptual', in turn, an experience	must go beyond the senses in the other direction, so that the experience contains little to no phenomenological content. (As I discuss in	Section 10.2, such experiences are	usually	seen	as	the	end	achievement	of	a	lengthy	process	of	self-loss	or	selfannihilation	en	route	to	union	with	the	divine.) The	second	significant	feature	in	this	definition	is	its	emphasis	on	the	inherently	unitive	nature	of	a	mystical	experience.	Beginning	at	the	outset	of	the	20th century	with	William	James'	discussion	of	the	'four	marks'	of	a	mystical	experience in Varieties of Religious Experience,7	and	continuing	with	Evelyn	Underhill's influential	'five	stages	of	the	mystic	path'	in	her	Mysticism: A Study of the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness,8 modern scholars of mysticism	have	generally	upheld	a	conception	of	selfless	mystic	union	as	the	ultimate end	of religious experience.9	Thus,	Underhill talks about a 'death	of selfhood' in	her	depiction	of	the	unitive	life,	which	she	describes	as	the	highest	and	final stage of the mystic life,10	while	Jerome	Gellman	characterises	a	unitive	mystical 4 For	those	curious	as	to	what	Gellman	means	by	'experience'	in	this	context,	the	following	comment seems	of	note:	'Mystical	writings	do	not	support	William	James'	claim	(James	1958),	that	mystical experience	must be a transient event, lasting only a short time and then disappearing.	Rather, the experience	might	be	an	abiding	consciousness,	accompanying	a	person	throughout	the	day,	or	parts	of it. )RUWKDWUHDVRQLWPLJKWEHEHWWHUWRVSHDNRIP\VWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVZKLFKFDQEHHLWKHUÀHHWLQJ or abiding. Hereafter, the reader should understand "experience" in this sense'	(emphasis	added). 5 Text	elided:	'including	the	means	for	sensing	pain	and	body	temperature,	and	internally	sensing body,	limb,	organ,	and	visceral	positions	and	states'.	See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism (accessed	11	October	2017). 6 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017). 7 James	(1902). 8 Underhill,	for	instance,	describes	the	final	stage	of	the	mystic	path	(which	she	bases	on	John	of	the Cross'	writings)	as	the	'unitive	life'.	See	Underhill	(1911) as	well	as	Underhill	(1920).	The	previous four stages	are, respectively, 'awakening	of self', 'purgation	of self', 'illumination',	and 'the	dark night	of	the	soul'. 9 Whether	this	loss	of	self	should	be	understood	metaphorically,	ontologically,	or	phenomenologically	is	subject	to	debate.	For	our	purposes,	what	is	significant	is	merely	that	such	union	is	understood to	erase	any	distinction	between	the	consciousness	of	the	individual	having	the	mystic	experience	and the divine. 10 In	her	words:	'In	that	most	dear	relation	all	feeling,	will,	and	thought	attain	their	end.	Here	all	the teasing	complications	of	our	separated	selfhood	are	transcended.	Hence	the	eager	striving,	the	sharp vision,	are	not	wanted	any	more.	In	that	mysterious	death	of	selfhood	on	the	summits	which	is	the VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 157 20/11/2017 14:16 158 Christina van Dyke experience	as	involving	'phenomenological	de-emphasis,	blurring,	or	eradication of	multiplicity'.11	Achieving	this	form	of	mystical	union	is	generally	taken	to	be both	necessary	for	an	experience	being	properly	mystical	and	a	(retroactive)	sign that	such	an	experience	has	been	achieved. On	this	widely	accepted	understanding,	then,	affective	and/or	sensory	states	in which	the	subject	and	the	divine	remain	distinct	(such	as	visions	or	auditions)	do not	qualify	as	properly	mystical.	The	term	'mystical'	is	reserved	for	these	superor sub-sensory	unitive	states	that	grant	access	to	'realities	or	states	of	affairs	that	are of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection'.12	Because	my	focus	in	this	chapter	is	on	the	accepted mode	of	mystic	experiences	rather	than	their	epistemic	import,	I	will	not	discuss the	'realities'	mystical	experiences	purport	to	impart.	It	is,	however,	worth	noting that	they	are	meant	to	be	such	that	access	to	them	requires	utterly	transcending our	bodies	and	our	senses. In	ruling	out	embodied	states	such	as	visions,	auditions,	and	physical	closure (surviving	for	long	periods	of	time	without	taking	nourishment	or	excreting),	the modern	definition	of	mystical	experience	carves	a	narrow	swath	in	the	full	range of	reported	mystic	experiences.	One	might	think	this	tight	focus	is	appropriate: after	all, the	question	of	how	to	ascertain	whether	someone's	claim	to	mystical experiences is	valid	has	been	a topic	of	fierce	debate	since	at least the	Middle Ages. In the 14th and 15th centuries in the Latin	West, for instance, church authorities	were	understandably	alarmed	by	what	looked	like	the	claim	that-via the insight gained through	mystic union-people could transcend need of the church altogether.	Their alarm	was not entirely unjustified. In her	Mirror and Annihilation of Simple Souls,	for	instance,	Marguerite	Porete	(burnt	at	the	stake as a	heretic in	1310) argues that the soul can	be joined to	God in such	a	way that its will becomes God's will, and that a person in this state need not pray or attend	Mass	or	participate	in	any	of	the	regular	activities	of	the	Christian	life.13 Especially	in	light	of	the	enormous	surge	of	reported	mystic	experiences	in	the late	13th	and	14th	centuries	throughout	Europe,	church	leaders	became	wary	of people	and	communities	who	claimed	to	have	direct	contact	with	God;	after	the Reformation,	such	communities	were	often	actively	suppressed.14 In	the	20th	century,	debates	over	the	nature	of	mystical	experience	heated	up again.15	In	the	first	half, influential	scholars	such	as	William	James	and	Evelyn medium	of	Eternal	Life,	heights	meet	the	deeps:	supreme	achievement	and	complete	humility	are	one' (Underhill	1911:	444). 11 See	Gellmann	(2014). 12 Ibid. 13 Porete	is	linked	with	the	antinomianists	or	Free	Spirit	heresy	for	this	reason,	although	the	actual connection	is	quite	unclear.	See,	e.g.,	Lerner	(1972). 14 Communities	of	nuns	who	were	frequently	having	mystic	experiences	during	the	Eucharist	were sometimes	forbidden	the	host	until	such	experiences	ceased.	See	Walker	Bynum	(1991). 15 For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	history	of	the	term	'mysticism'	that	also	includes	helpful	references to	further	discussions,	see	Hollywood	(2012).	For	an	overview	of	the	complex	politics	involved	in	the struggle	to	define	mysticism	in	the	20th	century,	see	the	first	chapter	of	Beckwith	(1993). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 158 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 159 Underhill focused on the psychological and philosophical as	well as religious aspects	of	mysticism,	and	there	was	a	general	post-Freudian	and	Jungian	interest in	psychologising such experiences in	order to	uncover their true significance. This combined with the rise of medicine as a science and increased interest in identifying	physical	causes	for	altered	mental	states	to	produce	working	definitions of 'mysticism' and 'mystical experiences' from which physical and affective states were carefully ruled out-in part due to epistemological worries about how	to	distinguish	genuine	religious	experiences	from	hallucinations	or	medical conditions	such	as	epilepsy. In the	post-Auschwitz	world	of the	second	half	of the 20th century, the search for a universal divine that undergirds outwardly conflicting	world	religions	gained	ground,	popularised	by	works	such	as	Joseph Campbell's The Hero with a Thousand Faces	(originally	published	in	1949).	This push	towards	religious	pluralism,	epitomised	by	John	Hick's	work	in	influential volumes	such	as	The Myth of God Incarnate	(1977)	and	God Has Many Names (1980), stressed the similarities in	descriptions	of selfless	mystic	union	among different	religious	traditions	in	order	to	argue	for	a	common	basis	for	them	all. One	common	denominator in these	modern	discussions	has	been their	dismissal of embodied experiences as inferior states, and sometimes even as misleading	or	counterfeit	versions	of	true	mystical	experiences.	As	a	number	of	scholars have	noted	recently,	however,	in	ruling	out	these	sorts	of	experiences,	treatments of	mysticism	have	discounted	precisely those	mystical states	most common to women,	for	the	majority	of	people	reporting	such	embodied	mystical	experiences have been female.16 This dismissal of female experience has a long history. According to the widely accepted	Aristotelian	biology	of	the	Middle	Ages,	women's	mental	acuity	is	compromised by their bodies, which are more sensitive to sensory perception and thus	more	susceptible	to	bodily	passions	and	emotions.17	Although	this	sensitivity makes	women	seem	better	candidates for	certain	sorts	of religious	experiences (such	as	visions	and	physical	states	such	as	stigmata	and	closure),	the	idea	that their	bodies	consistently	overpowered	their	intellective	capacities	simultaneously calls	into	question	their	reports	and	judgements	about	such	experiences.18	Thus, after	the	surge	in	reported	mystic	experiences	in	the	13th	and	14th	centuries,	the people	whose	reports	church	authorities	were	most	likely	to	scrutinise	closely	and then	condemn	were	predominantly	female-a	result,	no	doubt,	buoyed	by	further persistent	cultural	and	religious	beliefs	that	women	are	less	trustworthy	than	men and prone to exaggerate their emotional and physical states.19 16 See	Jantzen	(1995)	and	Furlong	(2013)	for	book-length	treatments	of	this	topic.	Mooney	(1999) provides	an	explicit	discussion	of	how	gender	came	into	play	in	the	way	specific	mystics'	reported experiences	were	recorded,	altered,	and/or	understood. 17 In	Caciola	(2003),	Nancy	Caciola	addresses	why	women	were	seen	as	more	likely	to	be	possessed by	demons	as	well	as	to	experience	divine	visions,	auditions,	etc. 18 This	was	one	of	the	reasons	the	testimony	of	women	was	not	accepted	in	court. 19 For	detailed	discussion	of	the	sorts	of	experiences	being	reported,	the	general	increase	in	embodied mystical experiences in this time period, and their perceived relation to women and women's bodies, VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 159 20/11/2017 14:16 160 Christina van Dyke The	close	negative	association	of	bodies	and	emotions	in	women	continues through	to	the	present	day.20	This	association	also	played	an	unacknowledged	role in	the	exclusion	of	embodied	states	from	the	contemporary	philosophical	definition of mystical experience. In some cases, the negative associations between bodies and women is left implicit,	as	when	Evelyn	Underhill	dismisses	reports	of	ecstatic	union	and	other sensory	and	physical	mystic	states	as	a	result	of	'the	infantile	craving	for	a	sheltering	and	protecting	love'	that	is	'frequently	pathological'.	We	should	be	seeking to	transcend	our	bodies	and	ourselves,	she	claims,	not	to	wallow	in	pleasures	and pains that speak to our personal desires; such	visions and ecstatic experiences frequently	accompany	'other	abnormal	conditions	in	emotional	visionaries	whose revelations	have	no	ultimate	characteristics'.21	Although	Underhill's	disdain	for the role of emotions and physical aberrations in the mystic life is clear, what is left	unsaid	is	that	the	vast	majority	of	such	'emotional	visionaries'	were	women, and that the sort of	mystics	whose experiences typify the superior unitive life are	almost	exclusively	male.22	(It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	'ultimate	characteristics'	which these revelations lack are those identified by	Underhill herself as essential to true mystic union, and that they include self-abnegation and physical	transcendence.) In other cases, however, the negative associations between emotion, bodies, and	women	is	made	explicit.	David	Knowles, for	example,	describes the	'pure spirituality'	of the	early	Middle	Ages	as	'contaminated	by	another	current, that of a more emotional and idiosyncratic form of devotion ... deriving partly from the influence of some of the women saints of the fourteenth century, women such	as	Angela	of	Foligno,	Dorothea	of	Prussia, and	Bridget	of	Sweden'.23 As with	Underhill, Knowles associates purity of spirituality	with an emphasis on transcendence of the particularities of the body and its affective states; unlike his predecessor, Knowles makes the connection between undue emotionality and women clear.	Although some male mystics also report embodied experiences,	women	are	particularly	likely	to	be	linked	with	the	sort	of	emotional	and see	the	chapter	'The	Female	Body	and	Religious	Practice'	in	Walker	Bynum	(1991),	and	Grundmann's classic	(1936). 20 See	the	introduction	to	Bordo	(1993)	for	a	succinct	history	of	this	association	and	its	manifestations in	modern	culture. 21 Underhill	(1920:	20,	23). 22 The	exception	to	this	general	rule	is	Teresa	of	Avila.	Simone	de	Beauvoir	(1989)	speaks	approvingly of Teresa in her largely critical chapter in The Second Sex on 'The Mystic', for instance, and Gellman's lengthy	(2014)	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	article	from	which	the	definition	at	the	beginning of	the	chapter	(see	also	fn.	3)	is	taken	mentions	exactly	one	female	mystic:	Teresa	of	Avila.	Teresa is	of	obvious	philosophical	and	theological	significance-see	Christia	Mercer	(2017)	on	the	relation between her Interior Castle and Descartes' Mediations-but	she	comes	a	full	century	later	than	the explosion	of	affective	mysticism	that	paper	focuses	on,	and	she	is	not	embedded	in	either	the	same sort	of	cultural	movement	or	religious	communities.	Perhaps	this	is	why	she	is	consistently	upheld	as the acceptable sort of female mystic. 23 Knowles	(1948–9:	222–3). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 160 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 161 other	forms	of	religious	expression	which	are	portrayed	as	'tainting'	the	appropriately dispassionate, universal	modes	of true	mysticism	and connection	with the divine. The same negative connection between women, bodies, and emotional religious	experiences is	drawn	by	Simone	de	Beauvoir in	The Second Sex. In this groundbreaking	work	of	feminist	philosophy,	de	Beauvoir	is	sharply	critical	of	the majority	of	female	medieval	mystics,	arguing	in	her	chapter	on	'The	Mystic'	that women	are	more	likely	than	men	to	report	physical	mystic	experiences	because	of their	disadvantaged	status	as	Other,	which	has	led	them	to	become	more	susceptible	to	religious	fervour	and	extreme	emotional	states.	'Not	clearly	distinguishing reality from make-believe, action from magic, the objective from the imaginary,' she	writes,	'Woman	is	peculiarly	prone	to	materialize	the	absent	in	her	own	body.'24 In	other	words,	women	are	more	likely	to	passively	embody	their	religious	beliefs in	physical	and	emotional	suffering	or	ecstasy	than	they	are	to	attempt	concrete action	in	the	world	of	men	from	which	they	have	been	excluded.25 Prejudices	against	emotions,	bodies,	and	women	thus	factored	into	the	development	of	the	contemporary	understanding	of	mystical	experiences	as	necessarily involving	non-sensory,	selfless	union.	Even	Jerome	Gellman,	author	of	the	working definition	quoted	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	admits	that	'[t]he	thinking	that there is a common, unconstructed, essence to	mystical experience has	worked against the recognition of women's experiences as properly mystical'.26 Here	we	can	see	in	action	the	first	sort	of	corrective	role	that	historically	oriented philosophy offers: an examination of the development of conceptions of mysticism	in	the	20th	century	demonstrates	how	it	is	undergirded	by	problematic assumptions, and thus provokes a re-examination of its philosophical merits. In	Section	10.2,	I	demonstrate	another	aspect	of this	corrective	role, turning	to medieval	discussions	about	the	nature	and	range	of	mystic	experiences	in	order	to examine	the	philosophical	motivations	in	favour	of	excluding	physical	and	affective experiences from the properly mystical; as we will see, these motivations rest on	controversial	claims	about	the	nature	of	God	and	human	persons.	Furthermore, as I show in Section 10.3, the broader historical context was where standard views about	mystical	experiences	embraced	embodied	and	affective	expression. 10.2. Correction in Context: Apophatic Self-Abnegation Prejudices against emotions, bodies, and	women have influenced the development	of	current	philosophical	conceptions	of	what	counts	as	a	mystical	experience.	One	might	well	think	that	these	prejudices	(which	have	been	around	at	least as long	as	philosophy)	have	always	worked	against the inclusion	of	embodied, 24 De	Beauvoir	(1989:	672). 25 See	also	her	discussion	of	religion	in	her	chapter	'Situation'	in	de	Beauvoir	(1989:	621ff.). 26 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 161 20/11/2017 14:16 162 Christina van Dyke affective	experiences	in	the	mystical	canon-after	all,	attitudes	towards	the	body and towards women were not better	in	ages	past,	correct?	One	would,	however,	be wrong in so thinking. This is where historically informed philosophy has a second important corrective role to play: although there is a strain of	mysticism that excludes	embodied	experiences	from	the	properly	mystic	life-namely	apophaticism,	which	generally	focuses	on	the	ineffability	of	the	divine	and	the	inability of language	and thought to	express	any	direct	experience	of that	divine-such mysticism	represents	only	one	part	of	a	much	larger	tradition.	Its	cautions	against physical	and	affective	states	thus	need	to	be	understood	in	the	larger	context	in which	such	embodied	states	were	seen	as	the	mystic	norm,	and	the	reasons	those states	were	accepted	as	the	norm	need	to	be	taken	seriously.	This	approach,	like the	corrective	approach	described	and illustrated in	Section	10.1, is	also	easily generalisable	to	any	number	of	other	contemporary	philosophical	discussions:	it can	(and	should)	be	used	to	counter	mistaken	claims	of	'But	this	is	the	way	things have always been!' by presenting historical examples of real alternatives. The apophatic tradition in Western Christian mysticism, for instance, has a long philosophical lineage-arguably beginning with Plato's claims about the nature	of	the	Good	in	the	Republic	and	emerging	in	the	Middle	Ages	via	figures such	as	pseudo-Dionysius.	Developed	in	the	13th	century	and	onward	also	in	relation to the Islamic and Jewish mystic traditions, medieval apophaticism is typified	in	the	works	of	Marguerite	Porete,	Meister	Eckhart,	the	anonymous	English Cloud of Unknowing,	and	Nicholas	of	Cusa	(continuing	post-Reformation	most prominently	in	the	writings	of	Teresa	of	Avila	and	John	of	the	Cross).	During	the centuries in	which	mysticism	flourished as a form	of religious expression and in	which	it	(arguably)	found	its	fullest	form,	however,	apophaticism	was	a	nondominant	tradition	that	frequently	flirted	with	heresy.	This	fact,	of	course,	makes no	difference	for	its	philosophical	plausibility;	what	does	prove	significant	is	that in advocating a selfless	merging	with an	unknowable	God as the	ultimate end of	human	existence,	apophatic	mysticism	assumes	highly	contentious	premises about	both	God	and	human	nature. Apophatic	mystics	tend	to	describe	the	spiritual	life	as	a	series	of	stages	that we	move	through	in	a journey	towards	unknowing	union	with the	unknowable divine. In this journey, one of the	most important tasks is self-abnegation, or radical self-loss. In the Mirror of Simple Souls,	for instance,	Marguerite	Porete explains	how	we	can	gain	desired	union	with	God	through	complete	elimination of	the	conscious	self: All	things	are	one	for	her	[the	Soul],	without	an	explanation	(propter quid),	and	she is	nothing	in	a	One	of	this	sort.	Thus	the	Soul	has	nothing	more	to	do	for	God	than God	does	for	her.	Why?	Because	He	is,	and	she	is	not.	She	retains	nothing	more	of herself	in	nothingness,	because	He	is	sufficient	of	Himself,	because	He	is	and	she is	not.	Thus	she	is	stripped	of	all	things	because	she	is	without	existence,	where	she was before she was created.27 27 Porete	(1993:	218),	translation	slightly	modified.	As	Barbara	Newman	notes	in	her	discussion	of VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 162 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 163 This	stress	on	self-abnegation	runs	throughout	Porete's	work:	such	annihilation	is essential	for	the	sort	of	complete	union	with	God	she	advocates.	Meister	Eckhart also frequently exhorts his listeners to detach themselves from all individual affections and	desires, so that they can	prepare themselves for the	final act of self-abnegation.	In	Counsel	23,	he	states	baldly:	'There	is	still	one	work	[after	the soul	has	detached	itself	from	worldly	concerns]	that	remains	proper	and	his	own, and that is annihilation of self.'28	It	is	often	unclear	in	such	texts	precisely	how	to understand	this	sort	of	self-abnegation	(is	it	meant	to	be	understood	literally	or metaphorically,	ontologically	or	phenomenologically?),	but	the	stress	on	removing	any	sense	of	self	that	might	impede	complete	union	with	God	is	consistent throughout	the	apophatic	tradition.29 Given	this	emphasis	on	self-abnegation,	it	is	not	surprising	that	apophatic	texts frequently caution their readers against taking	unusual physical and emotional states	to	be	signs	of	mystic	union.	Such	states	might	indicate	a	sort	of	spiritual progress,	but	they	are	not	themselves	the	goal	of	the	contemplative	life.	Thus,	in his	late	14th-century	The Scale of Perfection, Walter Hilton warns against accepting	physical	sensations	as	signs	of	true	mystic	union,	whether	'in	sounding	of	the ear,	or	savoring	in	the	mouth,	or	smelling	at	the	nose,	or	else	[the	sensation	of] any	perceptible	heat	as	if	it	were	fire,	glowing	and	warming	the	breast'	(1.10).30 This is a direct jab at Richard Rolle's earlier Fire of Love, which describes Rolle's mystical experiences as including physical	warmth in his body (especially his chest), a sense	of surpassing sweetness, and the sound	of celestial	music.	The anonymous	14th-century	Cloud of Unknowing	takes	aim	at	Rolle's	'fire	of	love' as	well,	cautioning	that	such	experiences	might	even	signal	something	sinister: 'For	I	tell	thee	truly	that	the	devil	has	his	contemplatives,	as	God	has	his'	(ch.	45). Meister	Eckhart,	in	turn,	'tartly	condemn[s]	those	who	want	to	see	God	with	the same eyes with which they behold a cow'.31 Significantly,	in	all	these	cases,	the	God	in	whom	we	want	to	lose	ourselves is characterised as utterly unknowable and (at least for Eckhart and Porete) beyond	being itself.	Experience	of such	a	God	necessarily transcends	physical Porete's	theory	of	self-abnegation:	'In	this	dissolution	of	the	ego	no	room	remains	for	the	body:	even the	physical	humanity	of	Christ	is	no	longer	cherished	by	the	free	soul'	(Newman	2003:	203).	Porete explicitly	addresses	the	need	to	move	past	consideration	of	Christ's	humanity	in	chapter	79.	See	also Hollywood	(1995). 28 Counsel	23,	Meister Eckhart, 280. 29 In extreme cases, apophatic mystics even saw self-abnegation as allowing for an identity of the mystic	with	God;	when	no	egoistic	self	remains,	one	can	be	filled	with	God	to	the	point	where	one becomes God. When the title character of the 14th-century	'Sister	Catherine'	treatise	comes	out	of	a mystic trance and says to her confessor: 'Sir, rejoice with me, I am become God!', she is not boasting of	an	ascendance	to	divinity	but	rather	indicating	that	'she'	no	longer	exists,	properly	speaking. See 'The	"Sister	Catherine"	Treatise',	trans.	Elvira	Borgstädt,	in	McGinn	(1986:	358).	For	further	discussion	of	this	treatise	and	also	this	general	tradition,	see	McGinn	(2005).	For	a	book-length	treatment	of this	topic	(that	focuses	particularly	on	Meister	Eckhart),	see	Morgan	(2013). 30 Manuscript:	Cambridge	University	Library	MS	Add.	6686,	p.	284. 31 McGinn	(1981:	61).	The	sermon	referenced	is	Sermon	16b	in	Meister	Eckhart	(1936–	:	272). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 163 20/11/2017 14:16 164 Christina van Dyke and affective experience: for	most apophatics, it entails the loss of consciousness itself.	Human	beings thus	find their end	not just in separating their souls permanently	from	the	body	(a	claim	in	direct	contradiction	with	both	a	holistic conception	of	the	human	being	and	the	doctrine	of	the	resurrection	of	the	body), but	in	perfecting	the	act	of	self-annihilation.	The	highest	form	of	mystical	union for	the	apophatic	tradition	is	one	in	which	neither	human	beings	nor	God	exist	in standard ways. In	part	because	of	this,	apophaticism	was	never	the	leading	mystical	tradition in the	medieval period. Instead, particularly during the 13th to 15th centuries, when the Western Christian contemplative movement was at its height, a more body-friendly and affective mysticism formed the dominant tradition, finding expression in a host of religious communities throughout Europe. In Section 10.3, I turn to this tradition.	Contemporary discussions in analytic philosophy of	religion	ignore	the	reports	of	the	vast	number	of	people	who	claim	to	experience embodied states that connect them directly to the incarnate God. Whether this	oversight	results	from	ignorance	of the	relevant tradition	or	from	adopting the	problematically	exclusionary	conception	of	mystical	experience	discussed	in Section	10.1,	it	represents	precisely	the	sort	of	conceptual	lacuna	that	historical philosophy	is	primed	to	correct.	I	thus	offer	this	correction	as	the	conclusion	of my	case	study,	turning	in	the	final	section	(10.4)	to	a	discussion	of	other	benefits this historically based approach to philosophy yields-most notably, rich points of	connection	with	disciplinary	fields	beyond	our	own. 10.3. Correcting via Complement: Embodied Mystical Experiences As	we saw in	Section	10.1, affective	mysticism is often dismissed	because of its association with the body and with emotions. This is, however, to miss the primary	significance	of	such	forms	of	connection	with	the	divine.	Human	beings are	physical	and	affective	as	well	as	intellective	and	volitional	beings:	our	primary interaction with reality-created and divine-is physical. Whereas the apophatic tradition	urges	us	to	transcend	those	modes	of	interaction,	the	affective	tradition encourages	us	to	delve	more	deeply	into	them.	Once	we	recognise	the	problematic prejudices	that	shaped	the	contemporary	conception	of	mystical	experience	and the	controversial	philosophical	assumptions	underlying	the	apophatic	exclusion of embodied experiences, we are in a position to see the rich history of embodied mystical experiences reported in the Middle Ages as offering a vital complement	to	the	narrow	range	of	religious	experiences	currently	studied	by	analytic philosophers. As with the corrective approaches mentioned in Sections 10.1 and 10.2,	this	method	is	perfectly	generalisable	for	any	number	of	similar	situations: contemporary	discussions	of	love,	of	happiness,	of	persons,	and	so	on,	would	all be	enhanced	by	pulling	back	from	the	idiosyncratic	foci	of	modern	philosophy and incorporating insights from the past. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 164 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 165 In the case at hand, it is worth noting that the medieval emphasis on embodied contemplative	experiences	developed in	part as a response to	12th-century gnostic	movements that either	denied	or	de-emphasised	Christ's humanity and taught the	need for	purifying	our immaterial souls from the inherently corrupt material	realm.	In	other	words,	the	push	to	transcend	our	bodies	in	apophatic	mystical	union	was	viewed	as	displaying	an	important	misunderstanding	of	both	God and	human	nature.	In	the	mainstream	contemplative	tradition,	figures	as	diverse in	education,	social	status,	and	geographical location	as	Hadewijch	of	Brabant, Catherine	of	Siena,	Richard	Rolle,	Marguerite	of	Oingt,	Beatrice	of	Nazareth,	Ida of	Louvain,	and	Angela	of	Foligno	viewed	altered	physical	states	(such	as	mystic death	or	bodily	'closure'),	emotional	states (such	as	uncontrollable	weeping	or laughter),	and	parasensory	states	(such	as	visions	and	auditions)	not	as	distracting from	true	mystic	union	but	as	ways	of	experiencing a direct connection with the God	who	had	become	incarnate	for	us. One	sign	of	this	tradition's	understanding	of	the	properly	spiritual	subject	as a	holistic	union	of	body	and	soul	(as	opposed	to	a	soul	seeking	to	rise	above	the material)	is	its	reliance	on	the	imagination.	In	the	13th	century	and	onward,	the imagination	was	generally	taken	to	be	the	faculty	of	the	human	soul	that	stores phantasms (mental 'pictures' formed via information collected by the external senses)	and	then	is	able	to	combine	those	phantasms	in	both	familiar	and	unfamiliar ways.32	In	a	popular	spiritual	exercise	of	the	time,	contemplatives	were	encouraged	to	imagine	themselves	present	at	key	moments	of	Christ's	life,	particularly his	Passion,	the	explicit	purpose	of	which	was	to	generate	certain	sorts	of	affective responses	that	would	deepen	the	subject's	devotion.33 This use of the imagination in spiritual exercises	was also closely linked with the idea	of 'spiritual	vision' (visio spiritualis), a concept	borrowed from the	Augustinian	Platonic	tradition.	In	contrast	both	to	the	sort	of	material	vision (via the eye)	which is directed at physical objects and to the sort of intellective vision (via reason) which is directed at divine truths, spiritual vision is directed at images held in the imagination.	As such, it	mediates between our physical	sense	capacities	and	our	intellective	and	volitional	capacities;	physical experiences and intellective experiences come together and are combined in significant ways in spiritual vision (also associated in this tradition with the 'inner	senses'	and	the	'inner	body').	In	the	affective	mystical	tradition,	meditative exercises such as imagining oneself present at the Crucifixion allow the inner	senses	to	undergo	spiritual	experiences	with	transformative	physical	and intellective/volitional	effects.	In	the	words	of	Niklaus	Largier,	such	meditation 'helps construct an inner space that creates affectively embodied access to the divine'.34 32 For	a	clear	exposition	of	how	phantasms	function	in	human	cognition	for	Aquinas,	whose	view	on this	issue	was	extremely	influential	in	this	period,	see	MacDonald	(1993). 33 For	further	discussion	of	this	meditation	and	its	use	of	the	imagination,	see	Matter	(2012). 34 Largier	(2003). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 165 20/11/2017 14:16 166 Christina van Dyke Because	strong	emotion	was	closely	linked	both	to	bodies	and	to	our	ability to	imagine	things	vividly	(driving	us	to	deeper	devotion	and	closer	communion with	God),	it	was	welcomed	in	forms	of	religious	expression	that	celebrated	the Incarnation.	The	mystical	visions,	auditions,	smellings,	tastings,	and	so	on	associated	with such	affect	were	not	understood	as the result	of	overexcited sensory capacities	but	as	important	spiritual	experiences,	and	valued	as	such.	As	Patricia Dailey notes: The	goal	of	affective	mysticism	is	not	to	excite	the	outer	body	into	a	Bacchic	frenzy, but	to	allow	one's	affective	and	thus	embodied	experience	to	stimulate	the	construction of the inner body and then to allow the heart, innards, or inner senses to speak and	act	through	the	outer	body.35 Embodied	mystical	experiences	were	seen	as	connecting	the	human	subject	to God	in	ways	that	enhanced	rather	than	abnegated	our	distinctive	humanity:	'All Christ's members-eyes, breasts, lips and so on-were seen as testimony to his humanation,	and	the	devout	soul	responded	to	this	enfleshing	with	all	its	bodily capabilities.'36 Consider the following vision that Hadewijch of Brabant reports having during	the	celebration	of	the	Eucharist	(a	particularly	significant	act	in	the	affective tradition, since it involves a mystical physical connection between Christ and the	person	receiving	the	elements):37 With that he came in the form and clothing of a Man, as he was on the day when he	gave	us	his	Body	for	the	first	time	...	and	he	gave	himself	to	me	in	the	shape	of the	Sacrament,	in	its	outward	form,	as	the	custom	is;	and	then	he	gave	me	to	drink from	the	chalice,	in	form	and	taste,	as	the	custom	is.	After	that	he	came	himself	to me, took me entirely in his arms, and pressed me to him; and all my members felt his	in	full	felicity,	in	accordance	with	the	desire	of	my	heart	and	my	humanity.	So I	was	outwardly	satisfied	and	fully transported	...	[After	a	short time]	I	saw	him completely	come	to	naught	and	so	fade	and	all	at	once	dissolve	that	I	could	no	longer recognize	or	perceive	him	outside	me,	and	I	could	no	longer	distinguish	him	within me.	Then	it	was	to	me	as	if	we	were	one	without	difference.	(Vision	Seven)38 This	account	begins	with	a	very	physical	sort	of	mystic	union	with	Christ (via the	inner	senses):	note	that	it	is	described	as	fulfilling	the	desire	of	her	humanity. Even	when	she	reports	the	later	experience	of	being	'as	if	we	were	one	without difference' with God, the metaphor at play is one of digestion: Christ has become one	with	her	(and	she	with	him)	in	the	way	that	food	and	drink	become	one	with us-part	of	our	very	being. 35 Dailey	(2012:	269). 36 Walker	Bynum	(1991:	91). 37 Caroline	Walker	Bynum	has	written	extensively	on	the	significance	the	Eucharist	takes	on	in	the affective tradition; see the chapters 'The Body of Christ in the Later Middle Ages' and 'Women Mystics	and	Eucharistic	Devotion	in	the	Thirteenth	Century'	in	Walker	Bynum	(1991). 38 Hadewijch	(1980:	281). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 166 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 167 Although	Hadewijch	also	frequently	describes	a	loss	of	self	in	mystic	union, she does so without downplaying the significance of affective and embodied experiences.	This	acknowledgment	of the importance	of	physicality for	human subjects	is	present	in	her	metaphorical	language	as	well.	In	one	particularly	striking	depiction	of	union	with	the	divine,	for	instance,	she	describes	how	complete union	can	also	include	eternal	self-preservation: Where	the	abyss	of	his	wisdom	is,	God	will	teach	you	what	he	is,	and	with	what wondrous	sweetness	the	loved	one	and	the	Beloved	dwell	one	in	the	other,	and	how they	penetrate	each	other	in	a	way	that	neither	of	the	two	distinguishes	himself	from the	other.	But	they	abide	in	one	another	in	fruition,	mouth	in	mouth,	heart	in	heart, body	in	body,	and	soul	in	soul,	while	one	sweet	divine	nature	flows	through	both	and they	are	both	one	thing	through	each	other,	but	at	the	same	time	remain	two	different selves-yes,	and	remain	so	forever.	(Letter	9)39 A	less	developed	but	just	as	striking	portrayal	of	this	sort	of	physical	and	selfpreserving union is	Marguerite of	Oingt's vision in	which she sees herself as a withered tree that is then watered by a stream that is Christ.40 Having drawn the	'living	water'	into	herself,	Marguerite	then	sees	the	names	of	the	five	senses written	on	her	newly	revived	branches.	In	this	way,	she	experiences	both	union with	God,	as	the	water	fully	penetrates	the	tree	of	her	selfhood,	and	the	preservation	and	flourishing	of	that	self,	in	body	as	well	as	spirit. There	is	much	more	to	be	said	on	this	topic,	of	course,	and	an	extensive	literature	reporting	affective	and/or	embodied	mystical	experiences	that	involve	unmediated	union	with	God.	Even	this	brief	discussion	should	be	sufficient,	however, to	demonstrate	that	inclusion	of	these	states	would	enrich	and	complement	current philosophical	discussions.	As	we	have	seen,	even	an	exclusive	focus	on	reports	of unitive	mystical	experiences	(as	the	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	definition	addressed in	Section	10.1	does)	need	not rule	out	embodied	and	affective mystical	states.	Ongoing	debates	in	analytic	philosophy	concerning	the	nature	and role	of	religious	and	mystical	experiences	would	benefit	from	considering	embodied	mystical experiences together	with those of selfless union-particularly in light	of	the	spurious	motivation	undergirding	their	exclusion	in	the	first	place. 10.4. Philosophical Morals and Historical Stories So	far	in	this	chapter,	I	have	focused	on	the	corrective	and	complementary	roles that a historically oriented approach can occupy in philosophical discussions. First,	I	have	argued	that	analysis	of	the	development	of	key	definitions,	concepts, principles, and so on, can often illuminate problematic prejudices that should motivate a re-examination of the philosophical considerations in their favour. Secondly,	I	have	claimed	that	this	re-examination	should	involve	looking	at	the 39 Hadewijch	(1980:	66). 40 Duraffour	et al.	(1965:	139). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 167 20/11/2017 14:16 168 Christina van Dyke relevant historical context in which the idea developed. Thirdly, I have demonstrated	via	the	case	study	of	medieval	and	modern	conceptions	of	mystical	experience	that	turning	to	the	relevant	historical	context	can	sometimes	provide	viable philosophical	resources	with	which	to	complement	existing	discussions.	In	this fourth	and	final	section,	I	conclude	by	suggesting	that	this	approach	can	also	help philosophers	engage	in	meaningful	interaction	with	scholars	working	on	similar topics in other disciplines. Consider again the example of the contemporary philosophical conception of mystical	experience,	which	picks	out	a	narrow	swath	of	the	sum	total	of	reported mystical experiences, and which correspondingly restricts philosophical investigations of mysticism in general. As I noted in Section 10.1, this conception is specifically characterised as 'suiting	more specialized treatments of	mysticism in philosophy'41	for	its	focus	on	particular	sorts	of	unitive	experiences.	But	what about	the	addition	of	'unitive'	in	the	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	definition	makes	it	suited	to	philosophical	examination?	Basically,	the	fact	that	it	picks out the particular range of experiences that philosophers became interested in over	the	course	of	the	20th	century.	As	we	saw,	though,	predispositions	against women,	bodies,	and	emotions	played	an	important	role	in	developing	that	focus.42 Not	only	is	this	lamentable	on	purely	philosophical	grounds,	but	it	has	also	interfered	with	philosophers	having	productive	conversations	outside	their	own	field. There	is	a	vast	literature	on	mysticism	and	mystical	experiences	by	scholars in	religious,	medieval,	and	gender	studies,	for	instance,	as	well	as	in	history	and in the	various languages in	which	medieval	mystic texts	were	written.	Careful studies	of particular contemplative	figures, general	movements, and the	nature of	mysticism	itself	abound	in	these	fields.	And	yet	philosophers	have	distanced themselves	from	these	resources	and	stuck	to	increasingly	specialised	discussions of idiosyncratic experiences. The recent Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism	contains	essays	by	twenty-two	scholars	at	various	career	stages	who represent thirteen distinct disciplines-and there is not a philosopher among them. The reason for this is simple: the 'philosophical' conception of mystical experience	corresponds	so	poorly	to	what	everyone	else	is	talking	about	that	there is almost no point in trying to engage in a common conversation. Philosophers excel at biting	bullets, and this complete lack	of engagement with	other	disciplines	might	be	one that some	would	happily swallow.	By this point	in	the	chapter,	however,	I	hope	that	it	is	clear	what	philosophy	would	lose out	on	as	a	result.	As	noted	in	Section	10.3,	there	exists	a	rich	history	of	embodied and affective mystical experiences-and a correspondingly rich secondary 41 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017). 42 There is	also	a	contemporary	focus	on	distinguishing true	from	false	mystic	experiences,	which belies	epistemological	concerns	that	mystics	themselves	largely	do	not	express.	The	idea	that	it	would somehow	be	easier	to	determine	whether	a	superor	sub-sensory	unitive	experience	is	veridical	than whether an embodied mystical experience is veridical, however, seems to me to betray precisely the sort	of	distrust	of	the	body,	emotions,	and	the	people	most	likely	to	report	having	these	experiences that	makes	the	contemporary	definition	problematic	in	the	first	place. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 168 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 169 literature on these experiences in any number of other disciplines-that could be	used to	enhance	current	philosophical	discussions	of	mystical and religious experience.	Realising	this,	however,	requires	doing	historically	informed	work. The	general	applicability	of	this	particular	case	study	should	be	obvious:	philosophy often paints itself into an ideological corner when it looks only to itself for	insight.	In	any	number	of	cases,	it	has	arrived	at	a	starved	and	impoverished version	of	the	conversation	current	in	broader	cultural	circles:	about	love,	about happiness,	about	knowledge,	about	embodiment,	and	so	on.	Rather	than	congratulate	ourselves	for	having	figured	out	what	'really	matters'	and	sticking	to	that,	we would	do	well	to	interact	with	discussions	happening	in	other	fields-something we	will	only	be	in	a	position	to	do	if	we	have	first	done	the	work	of	examining the	historical	underpinnings	of	our	operating	assumptions,	correcting	and	complementing them as necessary.43 References Beckwith, S. (1993), Christ's Body: Identity, Culture, and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London,	Routledge). Bordo,	S.	(1993),	Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body	(Berkeley CA,	University	of	California	Press). Caciola,	N.	(2003), Discerning Spirits, Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages (Ithaca	NY,	Cornell	University	Press). Dailey,	P. (2012), 'The	Body and Its	Senses', in	A.	Hollywood	&	P.	Dailey (eds),	The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press),	264–76. De	Beauvoir,	S.	(1989),	The Second Sex,	trans.	H.M.	Parshley	(New	York,	Vintage	Books). Duraffour,	A.,	Gardette,	P.,	&	Durdilly,	P.	(eds	and	trs)	(1965),	Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d'Oingt	(Publications	de	l'Institut	de	Linguistique	Romane	de	Lyon,	21;	Paris,	Belles Lettres). Eckhart,	M. (1936–),	Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke, 13 vols, herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft	(Stuttgart	&	Berlin, Kohlhammer). Furlong, M. (2013), Visions and Longings: Medieval Women Mystics (Boston MA, Shambhala	Publications). Gellmann, J. (2014), 'Mysticism', in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mysticism/ (accessed	11 October	2017). Grundmann,	H.	(1936),	'Die	Frauen	und	die	Literatur	im	Mittelalter:	Ein	Beitrag	zur	Frage nach	der	Entstehung	des	Schrifttums	in	der	Volkssprache',	Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 26: 129–61. 43 Many thanks to Marcel van Ackeren for the invitation to write on this topic, which has long interested	me,	and	to	Lee	Klein	for	her	assistance	and	patience	in	its	completion.	I	also	owe	gratitude	to audiences	at	the	University	of	South	Carolina,	the	2016	Pacific	American	Philosophical	Association (APA),	the	Classical	Theism	Workshop	at	the	University	of	St.	Thomas,	and	the	Society	for	Medieval Logic	and	Metaphysics for	helpful feedback	on	various	versions	of this chapter.	Finally, a special note	of	thanks	to	Andrew	Arlig	and	Adrian	Currie	for	detailed	comments	on	the	penultimate	version. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 169 20/11/2017 14:16 170 Christina van Dyke Hadewijch.	(1980),	The Complete Works,	trans.	Mother	Columba	Hart,	OSB	(New	York, Paulist	Press). Hollywood,	A. (1995),	The Soul as Virgin Wife: Mechtild of Magdeburg, Marguerite of Porete, and Meister Eckhart	(Notre	Dame	IN,	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press). Hollywood,	A.	(2012),	'Introduction',	in	A.	Hollywood	&	P.	Dailey (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Mysticism	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press),	5–8. James,	W.	(1958),	The Varieties of Religious Experience	(New	York,	Mentor	Books). Jantzen, G. (1995), Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University	Press). Knowles, D. (1948–9), The Religious Orders in England (Cambridge, Cambridge University	Press). Largier,	N.	(2003),	'Inner	Senses-Outer	Senses:	The	Practice	of	Emotions	in	Medieval Mysticism',	in	C.	Jaeger	and	I.	Kasten	(eds),	Emotions and Sensibilities in the Middle Ages	(Berlin	&	New	York,	de	Gruyter),	3–15. Lerner,	R.	(1972),	The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages	(Berkeley	CA, University	of	California	Press). MacDonald,	S.	(1993),	'Theory	of	Knowledge',	in	N.	Kretzmann	&	E.	Stump	(eds),	The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press),	160–89. McGinn,	B.	(1981),	'Introduction',	in	E.	Colledge	&	B.	McGinn	(eds),	Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense (Mahwah	NJ, Paulist Press). McGinn, B. (ed.) (1986),	Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher (New	York, Paulist Press). McGinn,	B.	(2005),	The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. 4: The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300–1500)	(New	York,	Herder	& Herder. Matter,	E.A.	(2012),	'Lectio	Divina',	in	A.	Hollywood	&	P.	Dailey	(eds),	The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press),	147–56. Mercer,	C.	(2017),	'Descartes'	Debt	to	Teresa	of	Avila,	or	Why	We	Should	Work	on	Women in the History of Philosophy', Philosophical Studies	174	(10):	2539–55. Mooney,	C.	(ed.)	(1999),	Gendered Voices (Philadelphia	PA,	University	of	Pennsylvania Press). Morgan,	B.	(2013),	On Becoming God: Late Medieval Mysticism and the Modern Western Self	(New	York,	Fordham	University	Press). Newman,	B.	(2003),	God and the Goddesses	(Philadelphia	PA,	University	of	Pennsylvania Press). Porete,	M.	(1993),	The Mirror of Simple Souls,	trans.	E.L.	Babinsky	(New	York,	Paulist Press). Underhill,	E.	(1911),	Mysticism: A Study of the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness (Grand	Rapids	MI,	Christian	Classics	Ethereal	Library). Underhill,	E.	(1920), The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays	(New	York,	Dutton). Walker	Bynum,	C.	(1988),	Holy Feast and Holy Fast: 7KH5HOLJLRXV6LJQL¿FDQFHRI)RRG to Medieval Women	(Berkeley	CA,	University	of	California	Press). Walker	Bynum,	C. (1991),	Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion	(New	York,	Zone	Books). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 170 20/11/2017 14: